Andrei Richter: Intergovernmental organisations on journalists in exile, special research report
Security. Belarus is mentioned 10 times. Abduction and extradition to their country of origin, followed by prosecution and imprisonment, are a significant risk for journalists in exile, especially those without proper legal status in neighboring countries. The world witnessed a blatant example of forced abduction in May 2021, when Belarusian authorities, disregarding international law and air travel protocols, used a false bomb threat to intercept and divert the commercial airliner carrying Raman Protasevich, a Belarusian media worker and activist in exile, flying from Greece to Lithuania. He was removed from the plane, arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced to eight years in prison before being pardoned.
Funding. Few media outlets in exile have a sustainable funding model; most rely on funding from civil society and philanthropy and are likely to remain so for some time. On the other hand, donor strategies are primarily focused on providing short-term funding to address acute crises.
However, thanks to advocacy and civil society efforts, there is a growing understanding of the need for long-term and sustainable donor investment and examples of innovative programs. Despite the numerous challenges facing exile publications, examples of positive experiences are emerging, highlighting the resilience, creativity, energy, and courage of exiled journalists and the civil society organizations that work with them. In an effort to overcome funding and operational barriers, exiled journalists are forming loose networks to share knowledge and challenges. One such group is the Exile Media Organizations Network. Members share experiences and advice on a range of issues, from censorship circumvention software to donor engagement strategies, and strengthen understanding of why audiences, donors, policymakers, and civil society should support exiled media.
Another interesting initiative is the European Foundation for Journalism in Exile (JX Fund), which acts as a clearinghouse, pooling offers of assistance and directing resources where they are most needed, allowing media workers to continue their work quickly and flexibly in exile.
Participating States committed to “using all possibilities offered by modern means of communications, including cable and satellite television, to promoting the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.”[11] At some point, they noted the growing role of the Internet and other technologies and adopted commitments in the area of Internet freedom. In this context, the OSCE Permanent Council decision[12] is of particular interest, including the Internet as part of the spectrum of media.[13] This decision thus paved the way for considering Internet freedom as part of media freedom, including within the scope of the mandate of the OSCE Permanent Representative on Freedom of Expression. This decision specifically stated that the Internet should remain “an open and public forum for freedom of opinion and expression, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).”[14] Later, participating States agreed to “voluntarily exchange information on the measures they have taken to ensure an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.”[15] The OSCE participating States called for “the adoption by journalists of voluntary professional standards, media self-regulation, and other appropriate mechanisms to ensure the enhancement of professionalism, accuracy, and ethical standards among journalists,” although this was done in the specific context of combating intolerance and promoting discrimination and mutual respect.[16]
The issue of protecting journalists was first raised in OSCE commitments in 1991, most likely following widespread attacks on journalists during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. In the Moscow Document, participating States agreed to “take, where appropriate, all feasible measures to protect journalists on dangerous professional missions, particularly in situations of armed conflict, and will cooperate to this end. These measures will include searching for missing journalists, establishing their fate, providing appropriate assistance, and facilitating their return to their families.”[17] The OSCE Budapest Summit condemned “all attacks on and harassment of journalists” and sought to “take immediate action against them.”
OSCE ICJ DECISION No. 3/18 SAFETY OF JOURNALISTS
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of this Decision is that participating States went beyond their previously restrained commitments to ensure the safety of journalists, agreed upon in 1994. While this commitment was monumental in holding governments accountable in the fight against impunity, it also meant that safety was, at best, a matter of a physical nature. It was the primary threat ultimately leading to censorship. To ensure a more comprehensive approach and, importantly, to recognize the multiple ways in which journalists are subjected to censorship, participating States declared their deep concern about “all human rights violations and abuses committed against the safety of journalists […] aimed at suppressing their work.” The Decision provides an extensive list of specific types of attacks, threats, and violence against journalists:
a) murder;
(b) torture;
(c) enforced disappearance;
(d) arbitrary arrest, arbitrary detention, and arbitrary expulsion;
(e) intimidation, harassment, and threats of all forms, whether physical, legal, political, technological, or economic, used to suppress their work and/or unlawfully force the closure of their offices, including in conflict situations.
This is an open-ended list of threats against journalists, including not only physical threats but also legal, political, technological, and economic ones. It can now serve as an important reference point for the Media Freedom Council (MFMC) in its efforts to “hinder the work of the media and create a hostile working environment for journalists.” The list itself is also based on the UN Human Rights Council resolution “Safety of Journalists”[20]. Participating States reaffirmed their commitments under the Budapest Summit Document (1994) to condemn all attacks and harassment of journalists and to bring those responsible to justice.[21] The Decision also states that “ensuring accountability” for crimes committed against journalists, or “bringing to justice for crimes against journalists,” is a key element in preventing future attacks. The Decision notes that when violent attacks against journalists go unpunished, a climate of impunity prevails. To ensure such accountability, the Council calls on participating States to improve the work of law enforcement agencies in investigating acts of violence and threats against journalists so that they lead to justice. This should be achieved by ensuring that investigations are conducted “promptly, effectively and impartially.” Victims of these crimes
CALL to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning violence against journalists and to condemn it unequivocally, in order to reduce the risks or threats to which journalists may be exposed and to prevent the undermining of trust in the veracity of journalists, as well as the undermining of respect for the importance of independent journalism;
Women journalists face a double burden: they are attacked for being journalists and for being women. Regular, abhorrent threats of a sexual nature have become part of life for women journalists, and effective responses are long overdue. States Parties agreed to “publicly and unequivocally condemn attacks against women journalists in connection with their work, such as sexual harassment, insults, intimidation, threats, and violence, including through the use of digital technologies.” However, this topic, overall, remained contentious for States Parties to reach agreement. This was particularly evident in the discussion of various adjectives that could be used to describe the “distinct” risks faced by women journalists. While there was no disagreement that women journalists face threats, only a few delegations argued that this issue may not merit separate consideration, as their male colleagues also receive threats. By then, dozens of credible studies[22] and the testimonies[23] of many women journalists had themselves curtailed any doubts that might have previously existed.
Participating States also committed to “encouraging public authorities and law enforcement agencies to engage in awareness-raising and training activities related to the need to ensure the safety of journalists, and to facilitating the involvement of civil society in such activities, where appropriate.” Many attacks, threats, and harassment against journalists go unpunished. In the worst cases, this is due to corruption and attempts to cover up crimes committed, perhaps for political or economic gain. But even with the best intentions, public authorities and law enforcement agencies often lack the capacity and resources to act quickly and effectively. This is particularly evident in the case of online harassment, the area of quasi-regulation, and the woefully inadequate level of preparation for its implementation. Implementing this commitment will be an important step for participating States in improving and updating preventive and countermeasures to protect journalism.
The practical tool for protecting journalists proposed in the Decision calls on participating States to “establish or strengthen, where possible, national systems for collecting, analysing and reporting data on attacks and violence against journalists.”[24] We note that the Decision largely incorporates provisions of the UN Human Rights Council resolution “Safety of Journalists.” It is also interesting to examine what was not included in the text of the OSCE resolution, such as measures to protect journalists’ confidential sources and threats to their psychological safety. While recognizing that journalists’ work can expose them to risk, “including through digital technologies,” participating States acknowledged the existence of many new vulnerabilities in the digital dimension, which are also inextricably linked to existing threats to journalists. With the development of technology and journalism, along with their benefits, a host of new issues arise regarding privacy and freedom of expression. Examples include revealing information about the movements of “journalists” through geolocation data linked to mobile phones, publishing their personal lives on social media, and collecting metadata about their communications.[25] The right to seek and receive information is restricted when the right to privacy is threatened or violated. As complementary rights, freedom of expression and privacy must go hand in hand, especially in the digital age, when more data is generated, stored, transmitted, and searched than ever before. States parties have highlighted the digital vulnerabilities of journalists, such as “being subject to hacking attacks or unlawful or arbitrary surveillance or interception of communications,” emphasizing that such actions “undermine their exercise of the right to freedom of expression and their right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy.” To ensure that these problems are addressed, participating States have committed to “refraining from arbitrary or unlawful interference with journalists’ use of encryption and anonymity technologies, and from using unlawful or arbitrary surveillance techniques, noting that such actions violate the right of journalists to exercise their freedom of action and could potentially expose them to the risk of violence against their exercise of freedom of action and threats to their safety.”
Baseline study:
OSCE participating States are encouraged to publicly recognize the valuable role of independent media and journalists in exile in promoting democracy, international security, and human rights as quality media services, and in countering harmful propaganda and disinformation. In this regard, exile journalists are encouraged to adopt voluntary professional standards, participate in national self-regulatory systems, and other appropriate mechanisms to ensure enhanced professionalism, accuracy, and adherence to ethical standards in line with existing OSCE commitments. Khan: Journalists in exile are vital in providing news of public interest to both domestic and global audiences.
They often provide an important alternative and perhaps the only independent source of information on developments in conflict zones or in countries where freedom of expression is severely curtailed. With their in-depth knowledge of the country, extensive connections, and their own sources, they present diverse perspectives, challenge official narratives, and debunk disinformation, which can be challenging for foreigners and dangerous for local media. Without mass media in exile, information black holes and zones of silence will arise on issues of concern to the global and national communities.
EMFA:
The European Media Freedom Act will, among other things:
– protect editorial independence,
– protect journalistic sources, including from the use of spyware,
– ensure the independent functioning of public service media,
– enhance the transparency of media ownership,
– protect media outlets from unjustified removal of online content by major online platforms,
EMFA speaks of the public’s right “to access quality media services provided by journalists independently and in accordance with ethical and journalistic standards, and therefore providing reliable information” (EMFA, 2024, 14):
In a well-functioning internal market, recipients of media services should have access to quality media services provided by journalists independently and in accordance with ethical and journalistic standards, and therefore providing reliable information. This is particularly relevant for news and journalistic content, which covers a broad category of content of political, social, or cultural interest at the local, national, or international level. In this context, news and journalistic content should be understood as any type of news and journalistic content, regardless of its form. News and journalistic content can reach audiences in various formats, such as documentaries, magazines, or talk shows, and be disseminated in various ways, including through online platforms. Quality media services also provide an antidote to disinformation, manipulation, and interference from foreign sources. Access to such services should also be ensured by preventing attempts to silence journalists, ranging from threats to censorship and persecution of dissent, which can restrict the free flow of information in society, reducing the quality and pluralism of information.
“Quality” media are described in the EMFA as those that enjoy editorial freedom, fulfill their vital “public watchdog” role, provide reliable (trustworthy) information, act in an independent manner and in line with ethical and journalistic standards, accept self-regulation, and (in the case of public service media) are impartial.[26] The notion of “quality media services” derives from the concept of “quality journalism,” previously promoted as a policy priority by the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on Promoting a Favourable Environment for Quality Journalism in the Digital Age.[27]
Press Club Belarus in its Strategic Concept (June 2025):
Belarusian exile media fully comply with the definition of “quality media services” as defined in the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). These media demonstrate editorial independence, exercise public scrutiny, and consistently provide reliable and accurate information. Their work meets high ethical and journalistic standards, involves self-regulation, and is characterized by impartiality—all key criteria set out in the EMFA. Belarusian exile media not only meet the above definitions but also, in many cases, serve as examples of how journalistic integrity and public value can be preserved in conditions of repression and exile. For example, publications such as Svaboda, Zerkalo, Nasha Niva, Reforma, Malanka, Belsat, and Euroradio consistently rank high in independent quality ratings and adhere to professional standards. Fifteen leading media outlets have signed a joint ethical charter and created a Media Ethics Council to ensure accountability. Their role in protecting the public interest is recognized by prestigious awards, including the UNESCO Press Freedom Prize (2022).
Thus, these “quality media services” enjoy a high degree of protection in Europe. In contrast, “rogue media services” that may harm democratic processes (referring to foreign propaganda and political disinformation) are afforded weak protection. “Rogue media” may be considered “constituting a serious and substantial threat to public security” and, therefore, may be subject to “special economic measures” (sanctions).
Lithuanian Media Support Fund (EUR 10.5 million) – 500 euros from them is better than 5,000 from a private foundation.
Creation of a Media Services Board – who will represent Lithuania?
2025 Rule of Law report – much of it about media independence and pluralism: the chapter on Lithuania makes no mention of exile media.
A study of the popularity of independent news channels in Russia (March 2025)[28]
“Opposition” media are similar thematically—the range of topics on “opposition” channels is approximately 60-70% lower than on “pro-government” channels. “Opposition” channels focus on issues not covered by other media (for example, repression and the aftermath of the war), and the range of these issues is quite limited.
Posts on “opposition” channels are, on average, 30% less positive than on “pro-government” channels, and 15% more negative. Channels with more positive content are more popular: a correlation between popularity and a positive tone exists among “opposition” media as well.
To expand their audience, independent media can:
Cover a wider range of topics
Focus more on everyday issues: the economy (rising prices and interest rates), emergencies in Russia, health-related news
Create more positive content: news about culture, animals, life stories, as well as collections of films, photos, music, and memes.
[1] OSCE, ‘Lisbon Document 1996, Lisbon Summit Declaration’, OSCE DOS.S/1/96, Lisbon, 2–3 December 1996, in OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 30.
[2] OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 26, p. 37, p. 46, p. 56, p. 64, pp. 69–70 and p. 75.
[3] Ibid., p. 69.
[4] OSCE, ‘Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, Moscow, 3 October 1991; ‘Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community, Summit of Heads of State or Government’, Astana, 3 December 2010, in OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 25, p.62.
[5] OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 19, p. 26, p. 59 and p. 74.
[6] Ibid., p. 26.
[7] Ibid., pp. 26, 28–30, 37, 56, 62 and 70.
[8] Ibid., p. 46.
[9] Ibid., p. 37.
[10] Ibid., p. 26.
[11] Ibid., p. 16.
[12] The Permanent Council is the principal decision-making body that meets regularly (usually in Vienna every Thursday) for political consultations and governing the day-to-day operational work of the OSCE between the meetings of the MC. It implements, within its area of competence, tasks defined and decisions taken by the MC.
[13] Later confirmed by the Ministerial Council. See OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 50.
[14] OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 51.
[15] Ibid., p. 67.
[16] OSCE (2017), Freedom of the Media, Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, supra note 5, p. 56.
[17] Ibid., p. 26.
[18] Ibid., p. 29.
[19] Ibid., p. 30.
[20] UN (2006), ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights’, supra note 93.
[21] OSCE (1994), ‘CSCE Budapest Document’, supra note 8, para. 37.
[22] International Women’s Media Foundation, ‘Attacks and Harassment: The Impact on Female Journalists and Their Reporting’, 2018, available at https://www.iwmf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Attacks-and-Harassment.pdf, last accessed 05/24/2019.
[23] OSCE, ‘Safety of Female Journalists Online’, video, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4HGLjb820s, last accessed 05/24/2019.
[24] Such databases are already in the making, for example, the draft Strategy for the development of public information system in the Republic of Serbia suggests to ‘[E]stablish the records about the number of criminal offenses or misdemeanour offenses committed to the detriment of journalists and other media professionals’. See Happy version of the Strategy for Development of the Main Information System of the Republic of Srbia, para. 2.1.2 ‘Security of novinar’, available at http://www.media.srbija.gov.rs/medsrp/dokumenti/nacrt_strategije.docx, last accessed 05/24/2019.
[25] UNESCO, ‘Building Digital Safety for Journalism: A Survey of Selected Issues’, 2015, p. 8, available at https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000232358, last accessed 05/24/2019.
[26] Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), Text with EEA relevance. PE/4/2024/REV/1. OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, Recitals 14, 19, 27, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj.
[27] Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on promoting a favorable environment for quality journalism in the digital age, 17 March 2022, https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/committee-of-ministers-adopted-texts/-/asset_publisher/aDXmrol0vvsU/content/recommendation-
( Dr Andrei Richter (Andrey Rikhter, Андрей Рихтер, Андрiй Рiхтер) Professor Researcher, Department of Journalism, Faculty of Arts Comenius University Bratislava )
